United States of America v. Hallman by unknown
1994 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
5-12-1994 
United States of America v. Hallman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994 
Recommended Citation 
"United States of America v. Hallman" (1994). 1994 Decisions. 13. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1994/13 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 




                                              
                                              UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
           
 
No. 93-1801 
           
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 





                                       Appellant. 
 
           
 
Appeal from the 
United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 93-00104-01) 
 
            
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 3, 1994 
 
(Filed: May 13, l994  ) 
 
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge, HUTCHINSON AND SEITZ, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
           
 
Jerry S. Goldman, Esquire 
Jerry S. Goldman & Associates, P.C. 
1520 Locust Street, 10th Floor 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 
    Attorney for Appellant  
 
Michael R. Stiles, United States Attorney 
Walter S. Batty, Jr., Assistant 
   United States Attorney, Chief of Appeals 
Virgil B. Walker, Assistant  
   United States Attorney 
2 
Office of the United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 
 Attorneys for Appellee 
__________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 Reginald Hallman ("Appellant") appeals a sentence imposed 
on him by the district court.  The district court had subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This court has 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
II.     
 On September 9, 1992, appellant used a stolen check to pay 
for a room at the Korman Suites in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  
At the request of federal investigators, local authorities 
arrested the appellant and located stolen mail after he consented 
to a search of his vehicle.   
 Appellant pled guilty to a state forgery charge and was 
sentenced to three years probation and restitution of $6,400. 
Appellant remained incarcerated, however, because he was 
identified as a fugitive from justice in Atlanta, Georgia and 
having charges pending against him in Delaware County (PA) Court.   
 On February 11, 1993, appellant was taken into federal 
custody pursuant to a four-count federal indictment.  It appeared 
that, using various aliases, appellant deposited stolen and 
forged checks into an account and then withdrew the funds 
therefrom (Count 1).  One of the checks deposited in this account 
was a check made out to the Internal Revenue Service (Count 2).  
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Appellant forged one of the stolen checks he possessed to 
purchase an automobile in the State of Alabama for approximately 
$14,000 (Count 3).  Lastly, the appellant was found to have been 
in possession of approximately sixty-one stolen pieces of mail 
(Count 4). 
 Appellant entered a plea of guilty on all four counts. 
After receipt of the Pre-Sentence Report and a hearing thereon, 
the defendant was duly sentenced.  He now appeals.   
III. 
 The standard and scope of review of the district court's 
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines is 
plenary.  United States v. Murillo, 933 F.2d 195, 196 (3d Cir. 
1991).  However, where the district court's application is based 
on factual analysis, we will reverse the district court only if 
its conclusion is clearly erroneous.  United States v. Ortiz, 878 
F.2d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1989). 
IV. 
A. Calculation of Loss 
 A search of the appellant's car after his arrest on the 
Korman Suites' forgery charge resulted in the recovery of sixty-
one pieces of stolen mail, mostly checks, that underlie Count 4.1 
Appellant objects to the calculation of "loss" in this count, 
which added $25,152.36 to the loss amount and one (1) point to 
his offense level.  Under USSG § 2F1.1, adjustments are made to 
the base offense level if the monetary loss exceeds certain 
                                                           
1The sixty-one pieces of mail included:  fifty checks, six 
bundles of blank checks, and five credit cards. 
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levels. Under § 2F1.1(a), the base offense level is six.  The 
Probation Officer calculated the losses to be $73,419.36.  This 
was arrived at by adding the losses suffered by the bank in Count 
1 ($34,282), the amount of the check in Count 3 ($13,985), plus 
the face value of the stolen mail in Count 4 ($25,152.36).  Under 
USSG § 2F1.1(b)(1)(G) six points were added to the base level 
because the "loss" exceeded $70,000. 
 The district court determined that the "loss" in regard to 
these stolen checks should be determined under USSG § 2B1.1.2  
The district court referred to Application Note 2 to USSG § 2B1.1 
as applicable.  The note defines "loss" as 
the value of the property taken, damaged, or destroyed. 
Ordinarily, when property is taken or destroyed the 
loss is the fair market value of the particular 
property at issue. . . .  Examples: (1) In the case of 
a theft of a check or money order, the loss is the loss 
                                                           
2To avoid confusion in considering the arguments advanced by 
appellant concerning the calculation of the offense score, some 
clarification as to which Guidelines sections are being utilized 
is necessary.  In our four-count indictment, there are both fraud 
and theft-oriented charges.  Under USSG § 3D1.2(d), conduct that 
results in offense levels being determined under Chapter 2 (e.g., 
theft and fraud) are to be "grouped" together.  Once grouped 
together, USSG § 3D1.3(a) requires that the highest offense level 
of the group is to be used.  Application Note 3 to § 3D1.3 states 
that "[i]f the counts in the Group are covered by different 
guidelines (e.g., theft and fraud), use the guideline that 
produces the highest offense level."  In this case, both 
guidelines, §§ 2B1.1 and 2F1.1, result in the same score--12 
points--and either could have been used to calculate the score. 
The use of these guidelines to determine the score, however, does 
not dispose of the need to refer to the appropriate guideline for 
the calculation of loss.  For example, although Hallman's 
indictment groups fraud and theft charges, we must refer to 
§2B1.1 to calculate the loss in regard to the theft charges 
(e.g., Count 4).  See 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (referring to § 2B1.1 of 
Guidelines).  This amount is then applied to the guideline used 
to calculate the offense level. 
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that would have occurred if the check or money order 
had been cashed. 
The face value of the stolen checks was $25,152.36. 
 A recent opinion of this court supports the calculation of 
loss based on the face value of the checks.  In United States v. 
Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1990), a couple was convicted 
of possessing stolen mails and selling stolen treasury checks.  
The amount of loss in regard to the checks was challenged on 
appeal. The defendants argued that the amount of loss should have 
been the sum of the amounts that were received for the checks 
upon resale. The court disagreed and held that "[w]hen a check is 
stolen, the cost to the party who ultimately bears the loss is 
obviously the face value of the check. . . .  Under such 
circumstances . . . a court does not err by valuing losses at 
replacement cost to the victim--in this case the face value of 
the stolen checks."  Id. at 80. 
 Appellant argues that some of the checks had no economic 
value because they were not valid either as a result of the 
passage of time or because payment on the checks logically would 
have been stopped.  This argument erroneously applies USSG 
§ 2B1.1. Application Note 2 specifically states that "loss" is 
"the loss that would have occurred if the check or money order 
had been cashed."  (Emphasis added).  Appellant's crime of theft 
of the checks was completed, although his criminal conduct was 
only partially completed.   
 Appellant argues that the Government failed to show an 
intent by him to use the checks and thus, the amount should be 
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lowered by applying USSG § 2X1.1 relating to "attempts."  In an 
effort to require the government to show intent, the appellant 
cites United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1992).  The 
appellant's reading of this case is in error.  The court in Kopp 
was distinguishing theft and fraud.  The court determined that 
when calculating loss in a fraud context, the calculation of loss 
should be based on "actual or intended harm."  Id. at 529.  The 
court, however, said that when calculating the loss in the theft 
context, applying USSG § 2B1.1, one need only apply the "simple 
`amount taken' rule" because "all thefts involve an intent to 
deprive the victim of the value of the property taken."  Id..  
The charge in Count 4 warrants application of § 2B1.1, and we 
must therefore examine "loss" in the theft context.  The district 
court's calculation of the amount of loss involved in Counts 1, 3 
and 4 is not clearly erroneous. 
B. Related Offenses 
 Appellant next challenges the calculation of his criminal 
history score.  The district court adopted the Probation 
Officer's career history calculation of thirteen points that 
placed the appellant in a category VI classification.  Appellant 
appeals the calculation on the ground that the Pre-Sentence 
Report contained two calculation errors when it counted related 
offenses separately. 
1. Consolidation for Sentencing 
 First, appellant argues that two prior sentences, listed 
at paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Pre-Sentence Report, were 
"related" within the meaning of USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) because they 
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were consolidated for sentencing.  Under Application Note 3 to § 
4A1.2,  
[p]rior sentences are not considered related if they 
were for offenses that were separated by an intervening 
arrest. . . .  Otherwise, prior sentences are 
considered related if they resulted from offenses that 
(1) occurred on the same occasion, (2) were part of a 
single common scheme or plan, or (3) were consolidated 
for trial or sentencing. . . . 
The district court determined that there was not a consolidation 
for sentencing purposes and adopted the Pre-Sentence Report's 
calculation. 
 After examining two case action summaries from the State 
of Alabama, we conclude that there may have been consolidation 
for sentencing, but that this conclusion does not affect our 
result as we find other grounds to sustain the separate 
calculation of the offenses based on our interpretation of 
Application Note 3.  The first sentence of that Application Note 
states that "[p]rior sentences are not considered related if they 
were for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest 
(i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to 
committing the second offense)."  The appellant was arrested for 
the offenses listed at paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Pre-Sentence 
Report on different dates. We read the "otherwise" in the Note to 
mean that if there is not an intervening arrest, then there may 
be other ways in which to find consolidation.  We need not 
consider those alternatives, however, as the district court's 
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counting of each separate offense was proper under our reading of 
Application Note 3.3 
2. Common Scheme or Plan 
 Appellant's second "relatedness" contention is that his 
conviction for the forgery of the check to the Korman Suites was 
improperly counted because it was "related" to the conduct in 
Count 4.  The forgery conduct consisted of the appellant's 
forging of a check, numbered 295 with the name "James La Roux" 
emblazoned on the face.  The check was one of a sequential series 
of checks with Mr. La Roux's name on them.  The appellant 
contends that the prior sentence he received for the forgery is 
related to the present offense of possession of stolen mail 
because it is part of a common scheme or plan.  Under USSG 
§ 4A1.2(a)(2), "[p]rior sentences imposed in unrelated cases are 
to be counted separately." According to Application Note 3 to 
§ 4A1.2, prior sentences are related if they "(2) were part of a 
single common scheme or plan . . . ." 
                                                           
3Our reading of Application Note 3 finds support in a recent 
decision in United States v. Gallegos-Gonzalez, 3 F.3d 325 (9th 
Cir. 1993): 
[T]he first question is always whether the underlying 
offenses were punctuated by an intervening arrest; by 
the logic and ordering of Note 3, that inquiry is 
preliminary to any consideration of consolidated 
sentencing.  The use of the word "otherwise" indicates 
that sentence consolidation is relevant only in the 
absence of intervening arrests.  Properly read, Note 3 
instructs that whenever offenses are separated by 
intervening arrests, the sentences for those offenses 
are unrelated regardless of whether sentencing was 
consolidated. 
Id. at 327 
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 On its face, the argument made by appellant is an 
erroneous application of the Guidelines because as a general 
rule, USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2) applies to the relatedness between prior 
sentences, not prior sentences to the present offense.  E.g., 
United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1337 (6th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Walling, 936 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Cir. 1991).  
Therefore, because we have only one prior sentence here, there 
can be no relatedness analysis under § 4A1.2(a)(2). 
 The appellant, however, suggests that under USSG 
§ 4A1.2(a)(1), the prior sentence and present offense are related 
because of the requirement that the prior sentence be imposed 
"for conduct not part of the instant offense."  Appellant's 
argument is that the conduct that led to his state sentence for 
forgery is part of the same scheme and conduct that led to his 
federal indictment on the count of possession of stolen mail. 
 Although neither party has cited a case that would be of 
assistance, there are several decisions from other circuits that 
throw some light on the issue.  The Sixth Circuit stated that 
"the appropriate inquiry is whether the `prior sentence' and the 
present offense involve conduct that is severable into two 
distinct offenses."  Beddow, 957 F.2d at 1338.  The Sixth 
Circuit's test was developed in response to the Tenth Circuit's 
decision in United States v. Banashefski, 928 F.2d 349 (10th Cir. 
1991).  In Banashefski, the defendant, a felon, placed a shotgun 
in the trunk of a stolen car and then drove the car away.  He was 
charged by the state with possession of a stolen car, and was 
charged by the federal government for possession of a firearm by 
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a felon.  The district court determined that there were two 
distinct possessory acts that were severable.  The facts in our 
case constitute a closer call.  Recognizing that possession of 
stolen mail is a distinct offense, we also note that possession 
of stolen mail in the form of blank checks suggests that 
additional conduct may be required for the actor to obtain ill-
gotten gains.  We do not adopt the Sixth Circuit's "severability 
test" based on our facts. Although Banashefski could have 
possessed the firearm or the car without the other and been 
charged with an offense for each, appellant here could not have 
forged a check until he had stolen the checks. 
 Although most conduct may be separable into distinct 
offenses, we believe the focus of the inquiry is on the conduct 
and whether that conduct is related--is it part of a common 
scheme or plan?  We agree with the Seventh Circuit's view that 
"[t]he Sentencing Commission . . . intended a broad reading of 
`related cases.'"  United States v. Connor, 950 F.2d 1267, 1271 
(7th Cir. 1991) (finding that sentences given for federal 
conviction and state conviction were related when they were 
brought pursuant to one arrest, despite separate trials).   
 In determining whether there was a common scheme or plan, 
intent of the defendant is a crucial part of the analysis.  In 
the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Coleman, 947 
F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1590 (1992), 
a defendant was being prosecuted on drug charges.  The court held 
that a sentence for retaliation by the defendant against a 
witness during a prior trial was not part of the scheme or plan 
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for which the defendant was presently being prosecuted because 
the retaliation took place after the completion of the drug 
offenses and therefore, could not be considered "`intimately 
related'" to the drug charges as the defendant had suggested.  
Id. at 1429-30.  
 The Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Ali, 
951 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1992), decided a case factually similar to 
the present one in which intent played a key role.  In Ali, a 
burglar argued that two prior convictions were related because 
they were part of a common scheme.  The two convictions were for 
the robbery of a supermarket and the forgery of a money order 
that was stolen during that robbery.  To quote at length, for it 
is quite relevant to our particular facts, the court in refusing 
to find a common scheme or plan and relatedness, stated that: 
No one robs without intending to obtain value from what 
is taken, and if that is a financial instrument on 
which a signature must be forged if it is to be cashed 
or otherwise used to the robber's profit the forgery 
could easily be thought a part of a single scheme or 
plan.  But "scheme" and "plan" are words of intention, 
implying that the forgery and the robbery have been 
jointly planned, or at least that it have been evident 
that the commission of one would entail the commission 
of the other as well.  If the decision to commit 
forgery arose only after the robber discovered what he 
had taken, the forgery would be no more a part of the 
scheme or plan to rob than would be retaliation against 
a witness of whose existence the retaliator was unaware 
when he planned the crime to which the witness has 
testified; and Coleman even narrowly read would 
therefore govern.  A crime merely suggested by or 
arising out of the commission of a previous crime is 
not . . . related to the earlier crime in the special 
sense of being part of a common scheme or plan. 
Id. at 828 (emphasis added). 
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 We hold that the appellant's possession of this stolen 
mail was part of a common scheme and plan and that the prior 
sentence for the forgery was for conduct that is related to the 
offense in Count 4.  Our conclusion rests on the fact that all of 
the stolen mail recovered in the search of the appellant's 
vehicle was in the form of checks or credit cards and that the 
check forged to Korman Suites was from a sequence of blank checks 
found within the stolen mail.  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
infer that the mail was stolen to find checks or other 
instruments that could be converted to use through forgery.  
 Because we hold that the forgery conviction and Count 4 
are parts of a common scheme or plan, the appellant's criminal 
history score warrants a reduction by one point.  This will 
result in a criminal history score of twelve and a Category V 
criminal history classification.4 
C. Restitution 
 The appellant's final contention is that the district 
court abused its discretion in requiring that restitution be made 
in the amount of $34,282 to the bank involved in Count 1 because 
it failed to make specific factual findings as to his ability to 
pay.     
 Restitution is authorized by the Victim and Witness 
Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a), and is incorporated 
into the Sentencing Guidelines at § 5E1.1.  Our review is plenary 
over whether an award is permitted, but we review the specific 
                                                           
4Thus, a sentencing range of 27-33 months will result as opposed 
to 30-37 months. 
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award for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Seligsohn, 981 
F.2d 1418, 1421 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 In exercising its supervisory powers, this court has 
required the district courts to make "findings as to the factual 
issues that are relevant to the application of the restitution 
provisions of the VWPA."  United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 
480 (3d Cir. 1985).  The district court is required to  
consider the amount of the loss sustained by any victim 
as a result of the offense, the financial resources of 
the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability 
of the defendant and the defendant's dependents, and 
such other factors as the court deems appropriate. 
 
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a)) (emphasis added).  The district 
court determined that the appellant could pay the amount 
proscribed within the period of his supervised release.  Our 
review is limited to "whether the record supports the finding."  
United States v. Sleight, 808 F.2d 1012, 1021 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 The district court did not impose a fine on appellant 
citing his "inability to pay."  Indigency at the time of 
sentencing is, however, not a bar to ordering the appellant to 
pay restitution. United States v. Logar, 975 F.2d 958, 962 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (citing ten other circuits in accord with this rule).  
The order of restitution, on the other hand, may not be based on 
some future fortuitous event that may befall the appellant, but 
must be based on realistic expectations.  Id. at 962-64; cf. 
United States v. Mitchell, 893 F.2d 935, 936 n.1 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(rejecting government's argument that a "high amount of 
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restitution is proper on the chance that the defendant may win 
the lottery"). 
 The district court based its order of restitution on the 
Pre-Sentence Report.  The Report includes an analysis of the 
financial impact on the victim, the bank, and details the 
appellant's physical and mental health, education, vocational 
skills, and financial ability to pay.  Specific findings by the 
district court determined that the appellant obtained a high 
school diploma; claimed to have obtained thirty-six college 
credits at the University of Alabama; was given an honorable 
discharge from the military for medical reasons; was once a part-
owner of a hair salon in Philadelphia that generated a monthly 
gross income of $1,500; earned $300 a night from 1990 until 1992 
as a private disc jockey; and had worked for his stepfather's 
business assisting in the design and installation of security 
systems.  The district court also adopted the findings of the 
report that found the appellant had purchased a 1991 Ford Mustang 
for $20,750 cash in 1991 and sold the same car in 1992 for 
$13,000.  Finally, the report noted that he could make $.15-.25 
per hour and possibly up to $1.25 per hour while incarcerated 
that could be applied to the amount of restitution ordered.  The 
district court stated at sentencing that "the defendant by 
education and natural ability that God and his parents gave him 
has the capacity to earn lawful income."  
 To sustain the district court's order of restitution, the 
appellant must "realistically [be able to] pay [the amount] 
within the five year period."  Sleight, 808 F.2d at 1021.  The 
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record supports a reasonable expectation that the appellant will 
be able to make restitution.  Putting aside the large amount of 
money that he received for the sale of his car (or the amount he 
paid for it in cash), the appellant's educational level and past 
work experience indicate an ability to obtain gainful 
employment.5   
 In light of the specific findings made by the Probation 
Officer that were adopted by the district court, and the time 
afforded the appellant in which to pay the amount, we cannot say 
that the district court's restitution order constituted an abuse 
of its discretion. 
V. 
 We approve the district court's calculation of the amount 
of loss involved, the separate calculation of the offenses listed 
in paragraphs 51 and 52 of the Pre-Sentence Report, and the order 
of restitution.  We will vacate the district court's calculation 
of the appellant's criminal history score as a result of our 
holding that the forgery charge and Count 4 were part of a common 
scheme or plan and should not have been counted separately. The 
                                                           
5We note that 18 U.S.C. § 3663(g) authorizes the court to "revoke 
probation or a term of supervised release . . . or hold a 
defendant in contempt pursuant to section 3583(e) if the 
defendant fails to comply with such order."  Although the 
ordering of restitution may not be an exact science, we also note 
that § 3663(g) also permits the court, in determining whether to 
revoke probation or supervised or to hold in contempt, may 
"consider the defendant's employment status, earning ability, 
financial resources, the willfulness of the defendant's failure 
to pay, and any other special circumstances that may have a 
bearing on the defendant's ability to pay."  We read this section 
as granting the court discretion to modify the restitution order 
in the future depending on the defendant's circumstances. 
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sentence of the district court will be vacated and the matter 
will be remanded to the district court for sentencing consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
